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Abstract—The wide spread of fake news in social networks is 
posing threats to social stability, economic development and 
political democracy etc. Numerous studies have explored the 
effective detection approaches of online fake news, while few 
works study the intrinsic propagation and cognition mechanisms 
of fake news. Since the development of cognitive science paves a 
promising way for the prevention of fake news, we present a new 
research area called Cognition Security (CogSec), which studies 
the potential impacts of fake news to human cognition, ranging 
from misperception, untrusted knowledge acquisition, targeted 
opinion/attitude formation, to biased decision making, and 
investigates the effective ways for fake news debunking. CogSec is 
a multidisciplinary research field that leverages knowledge from 
social science, psychology, cognition science, neuroscience, AI and 
computer science. We first propose related definitions to 
characterize CogSec and review the literature history. We further 
investigate the key research challenges and techniques of CogSec, 
including human-content cognition mechanism, social influence 
and opinion diffusion, fake news detection and malicious bot 
detection. Finally, we summarize the open issues and future 
research directions, such as early detection of fake news, 
explainable fake news debunking, social contagion and diffusion 
models of fake news, and so on. 
.  
Index Terms—Cyberspace; cognition security; fake news; 
crowd computing; human-content interaction.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid popularization and development of social networks 
have created a direct path from content producers to consumers, 
changing the way users access information, debate, and form 
their opinions. Instead of accessing news from traditional and 
curated mechanisms, such as news broadcast or daily news 
programs, people are turning to social media platforms which 
expose them to a broader range of opinions and information 
about the issues of the day. The growth of social media has 
changed patterns of consumption and exposure to a variety of 
news deliberately and incidentally, and social media platforms 
have become a major source of news 1, such as Facebook2, 
Twitter3, YouTube4, Instagram5 and Snapchat6. Although social 
networks have accelerated the dissemination of information and 
promoted the communication of people, contemporary social 
 
1 https://www.oberlo.com/blog/social-media-marketing-statistics 
2 https://www.facebook.com/ 
3 https://twitter.com/ 
4 https://www.youtube.com/ 
5 https://www.instagram.com/ 
6 https://www.snapchat.com/ 
media platforms offer a hotbed of spreading fake news due to 
their low cost, easy access and high anonymity. A survey 
conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that nearly 23% 
of interviewed Americans have ever reposted and shared fake 
news on social networks7. In addition, the existence of social 
bots, botnets and trolls have also been a severe problem in social 
media platforms. It is reported that as many as 60 million trolls 
could be spreading fake news on Facebook [1]. Furthermore, 
the prevalence of fake news in social networks confuses the 
audience, creates panic, and seriously affects public safety and 
mass cognition security [2]. 
The spread of fake news is posing threats to diverse domains, 
such as vaccine safety, climate change, political elections, and 
stock stability [3]. For example, during the U.S. presidential 
election in 2016, PolitiFact, an independent fact checker of 
political statements, judged 70% of all statements about Donald 
Trump to be false or mostly false8 and Trump’s supporters were 
far more likely to consume fake news than Clinton’s supporters 
[4]. Consequently, ‘fake news’ was named the “word of the year” 
by Collins Dictionary in 2017 since it has aroused spread 
concern of the world. In addition to political interference, fake 
news can also do great damage to social stability. For example, 
the fake news on social media about Turkish government’s 
implementation of capital controls led to a 20% drop in the lira 
against the US dollar9, causing huge economic loss in Turkey. 
The fake news which claimed that the border between Greece 
and North Macedonia was open made hundreds of migrants and 
refugees pour across the Greek border10. It further results in the 
clash between Greek police and migrants. Thus，it can be seen 
that fake news is one of the current greatest threats to 
democracy, economy and journalism [5]. 
In 2018, the Science magazine launched a special issue about 
‘Fake News’, where they discussed the conception, network 
propagation mechanism and social influence of fake news [2, 
6]. In [7], Ruths divides the dissemination process of fake news 
into five key components, consisting of publishers, authors, 
articles, audience and rumors. Qiu et al. [8] find that both 
information overload and limited attention contribute to the 
degradation of human’s ability to judge news whether fake or 
true. Lazer et al. [2] identify two categories of fake news 
interventions, including empowering individuals to evaluate the 
7 https://www.journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-ne
ws-is-sowing-confusion/ 
8 https://www.politifact.com/personalities/donald-trump/ 
9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/13/turkey-financial-crisis-l
-ira-plunges-again-amid-contagion-fears 
10 https://www.dw.com/en/greek-police-clash-with-migrants-near-north-ma
-cedonia-border/a-48240710 
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fake news and utilizing platform-based detection and 
algorithms.  
An urgent concern is that the development of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) technology puts forward higher requirements 
for fake news identification. The research of fake news will 
extend from text to high-quality, machine-generated and 
manipulated images, videos and audios on a massive scale [9]. 
For instance, Deepfakes [10, 11], creates audios or videos of 
real people they never said or did by neural networks, which 
has been widely used to forge politicians’ speeches and illegal 
evidence [12], resulting in hurting public feelings and affecting 
the political situation seriously.  
To summarize, fake news can influence the emotions, 
opinions, and other cognition activities through human-content 
interactions. With the idea that some information succeeds due 
to their content taps into general cognitive preferences [13], it 
is significant to understand the cognition and dissemination 
mechanism of fake news before checking the fact. This paper 
presents a promising research area called “Cognition Security 
(CogSec)”, which aims to understand the interaction patterns, 
cognition behaviors, and social influence & diffusion 
mechanism between human and fake news, and investigates the 
successful and efficient ways to debunk fake news and maintain 
human cognition security.   
CogSec is a multidisciplinary field of research that leverages 
knowledge from social science, psychology, cognition science, 
neuroscience, AI, and computer science.  
In particular, the main contribution of this work are three 
folds. 
⚫ Characterizing the Cognition Security (CogSec) 
research area, ranging from its concept model and 
research scope. 
⚫ Investigating the main research challenges of CogSec 
and presenting the state-of-the-art techniques to address 
these issues. 
⚫ Discussing the open issues and future research 
directions of CogSec. 
II. CHARACTERIZING COGNITION SECURITY 
In addition to fake news, there are other types of information 
spreading on social media platforms that threaten the CogSec, 
such as rumor, hoax, click-bait, disinformation, and 
misinformation. The widely-recognized definitions are 
summarized in Table 1. 
For characterizing the research area of cognition security, 
this section firstly presents the problem statement about CogSec. 
In this paper, we follow the definition of fake news used in 
recent papers [18, 19].  
DEFINITION 2.1. Fake news: A news article that is 
intentionally and verifiable false. 
The abundant users of social media platforms generate a 
massive number of contents based on social interactions. 
Human interact with such online contents and their perceptions, 
behaviors, and knowledge are implicitly influenced [20, 21]. 
We define the human-content interaction as follows. 
DEFINITION 2.2. Human-content interaction: Publish, 
share, like, and comment of online contents (e.g., news, posts, 
photos, videos, etc). 
We further give the definitions of cognition security and 
cognition security protection. 
DEFINITION 2.3. Cognition security: CogSec refers to 
the potential impacts of fake news to human cognition, ranging 
from misperception, untrusted knowledge acquisition, targeted 
opinion/attitude formation, to biased decision making.  
DEFINITION 2.4. Cognition security protection: 
CogSec protection is committed to effective intervention to 
ensure humans’ CogSec, including the techniques of cognition 
mechanism investigation, diffusion pattern mining, early fake 
news detection, malicious bot detection, and so on.   
Regarding the scale of human-beings the cognition security 
can affect, it can be categorized into the individual level, the 
crowd level, and the society level.  
 Traditional vision of network security [22] mainly 
emphasizes data and information security, while CogSec 
focuses on the complex interaction mechanism between human 
cognition and multimodal content of social media, expanding 
from the traditional “machine” security to “human-machine” 
fusion security, as presented in Table 2. 
TABLE I.  DEFINITIONS OF SOME TYPES OF MALICIOUS 
INFORMATION 
Term Definition 
Rumor 
An item of circulating information whose veracity 
status is yet to be verified at the time of posting. 
[14] 
Hoax 
A deliberately fabricated falsehood made to 
masquerade as truth. [15] 
Click-bait 
A piece of low-quality journalism which is 
intended to attract traffic and monetize via 
advertising revenue. [16] 
Disinformation 
Fake or inaccurate information which is 
intentionally false and deliberately spread. [17] 
Misinformation 
Fake or inaccurate information which is 
unintentionally spread. [17] 
Fake news 
A news article that is intentionally and verifiable 
false. [18] 
 
TABLE II.  DIFFERENCES WITH OTHER CONCEPTS 
Term Research Focus 
Security 
Paradigm 
Network 
security 
Data and content security Machine security 
Cognition 
security 
The interaction and cognitive 
mechanism between human and 
contents in the cyberspace 
Human-machine 
security 
 
Recently, there have been several related studies and 
important findings regarding this research field, representative 
ones as presented below. 
(1) Echo chambers [23-25]. It traps users by only exposing 
them to opinions and beliefs they are already in agreement with 
[26].  Echo chambers is compounded by the rise of algorithmic 
news recommendation and content filtering [27], which makes 
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users always browse their favorite information and implicitly 
influences users’ cognitive behaviors. For example, Barberá et 
al. [28] observe that information is mainly exchanged among 
users with similar ideological preferences in the case of political 
issues. Similarly, Quattrociocchi et al. [29] demonstrate that 
such echo chambers really reinforce selective exposure and 
group polarization. People tend to only concentrate on 
confirming claims and ignore obvious objections, because they 
focus on their preferred information. Moreover, Zajonc et al. 
[30] assume that the perceived accuracy of false information 
increases linearly with the frequency of exposure to the same 
false information, which means that fake news repeatedly 
appearing in echo chambers may gradually be accepted as true 
news. Above all, highly homogeneous echo chambers in social 
networks can decrease people’s ability to identify fake news 
and increase their misperceptions, contributing to spreading 
false information [31].   
(2) Online gatekeepers [32, 33]. It refers to information 
controller (information selection, deletion, manipulation or 
integration etc.) in the process of information dissemination 
[34]. Xu et al. [35] observe that users in social networks are 
highly likely to become gatekeepers. In [36], Garimella et al. 
explore the role of gatekeepers in the creation of echo chambers 
in case of political news, and they find these gatekeepers 
usually have lower clustering coefficient. Although online 
gatekeepers consume information with different viewpoints, 
they tend to share only a certain viewpoint to strengthen the 
homogeneity of target community and form a closed field of 
public opinion, which contributes to the dissemination of fake 
news [37]. Therefore, effective use of gatekeepers to prevent 
the spread of fake news needs to be further studied.   
(3) Media bias [38, 39]. It is one type of cognitive bias, which 
means that journalists are unable to report news events fairly 
and objectively due to their partial opinions [40]. As Jamieson 
et al. [41] recognize, the news media does not just report the 
facts, but is often affected by government influence, targeting 
at audiences’ preference, sponsor pressure and so on. Under the 
comprehensive impact of various aspects as well as the purpose 
of chasing headlines, media outlets often release claims without 
thorough verification, which provides an opportunity for the 
spread of fake news. Puglisi [42] finds that the New York Times 
may lean democratic. Besides, Gerber et al. [43] estimate that 
voters who read the Washington Post regularly are 8% more 
likely to vote democratic candidate in the 2005 governor 
election in Virginia. Many media researchers fear that 
unregulated media will have a major impact on our society [44], 
but competition among different media outlets can eliminate 
ideological bias in some cases [45].        
 (4) The spread of fake news [46, 47]. There are many factors 
that contribute to the spread of fake news, such as cognitive 
limitation of readers [48], usability of social media platforms 
[49], and demographics of audiences [50]. Some studies have 
been carried out on the propagation characteristics and 
structures of fake news. For example, DiFonzo et al. [51] find 
that rumors containing negative emotions are more likely to be 
spread. Guess et al. [52] state that conservatives are more likely 
to share fake news and that Facebook accounts over 65 years 
old spread about seven times as much fake news as the young 
during the 2016 US presidential election. Budak et al. [53] 
demonstrate that the popularity of fake news is the result of 
news production and consumption. They further find that male 
voters are more impressed by fake news publishers.  
III. KEY RESEARCH CHALLENGES AND TECHNIQUES 
Having characterized the concepts of CogSec and reviewed 
some related studies, this section investigates some key 
research challenges and techniques of this research area, 
including human-content cognition mechanism, social 
influence and opinion diffusion, fake news detection, and 
malicious bot detection.  
A. Human-Content Cognition Mechanism 
Understanding the mechanism that people share, repost, and 
agree of online contents is critical to protect their cognitive 
security. A thorough understanding of the mechanisms should 
rely on knowledge from psychology, cognition science, and 
neuroscience [54]. 
(1) Personality, content sharing, and debunking. 
Interpersonal social interaction, centered on content sharing, 
enables information to spread efficiently [55]. Actually, content 
sharing behaviors among users in social networks, such as 
publish, repost, and like, will gradually affect the reach and 
influence of news [56]. There are several studies that aim to 
learn information sharing mechanism in social media. For 
instance, Scholz et al. [57] present a neurocognitive framework 
to understand mechanisms under information sharing. Based on 
the New York Times health news articles dataset, they find that 
the core functions of sharing relate to both self-expression and 
social bond strengthen. Hodas et al. [58] reveal a systematic 
link between personality type and mood, brain response, and 
the type of content people choose to share online. They observe 
that users’ preferences might be predicted from both personality 
and transitory mood state. In [59], Falk et al. focus on neural 
responses of information consumers’ brains. They find that 
individuals are more capable of spreading their opinions to 
others, thus generating greater mentalizing-system activity in 
the initial process of information sharing.  
Some works predict content reposts in social networks. For 
example, Hu et al. [60] predict the popularity of pictures and 
their diffusion paths in social networks based on Diffusion-
LSTM, a memory-based deep recurrent neural network model. 
A combination of user social features and image features is used 
to characterize individual reposting behaviors. Similarly, Zhang 
et al. [61] propose an attention-based deep neural network to 
combine contextual and social context information for retweet 
behavior prediction.  
In [62], Lewandowsky et al. observe audiences’ memories 
for misinformation and study the role of cognitive factors in 
misinformation debunking. They further divide human 
cognitive problems in the face of misinformation into four 
categories, including continued influence effect, familiarity 
backfire effect, overkill backfire effect, and worldview backfire 
effect, which provides the theoretical basis and suggestions for 
CogSec protection.   
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(2) Neuroscience in human-content interaction. 
Neuroscience has also been widely used in many research areas 
(e.g., healthcare [63], intelligent control [64, 65], artificial 
intelligence [66], economics [67] etc.) related to human-
computer interaction. As presented by Poldrack et al. [68], the 
use of new tools, e.g., Electroencephalography (EEG), 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), and 
Magnetoencephalography (MEG), for imaging and 
manipulating the brain will continue to advance our 
understanding of how the human brain gives rise to thought and 
action.  
Regarding CogSec, neuroscience has been previously used 
for understanding human-content interaction. Some efforts 
have been conducted to understand/predict population-level 
behaviors/preferences (e.g., ratings and sharing in social media) 
based on small groups of individuals’ neural responses. For 
example, researchers test the possibility of using fMRI to 
predict the relative popularity of music11.  Dmochowski et al. 
[69] find that naturalistic stimuli (viewing multimedia contents) 
evoke highly reliable brain activities across viewers. Falk et al. 
[70] further conclude that neural responses of a small group of 
individuals can be used to predict the behavior of large-scale 
populations. In particular, neural activities in a medial 
prefrontal region of interest which are previously associated 
with individual behavior change can predict the population 
response. Hasson et al. [71] report the unexpected finding that 
brains of different individuals show a highly significant 
tendency to act in unison during free viewing of a complex 
scene such as a movie sequence. In [72], Adolphs identifies a 
series of neural structures involved in users’ perceptions and 
judgements of content stimuli, and analyzes humans’ ways of 
reasoning and decision-making. In general, neuroscience 
provides the theoretical basis for understanding human-content 
interaction, and has practical significance for the protection of 
public CogSec.  
B. Social Influence and Opinion Diffusion 
The study of social influence and opinion diffusion in social 
networks has a long tradition in the social, physical, and 
computational sciences. For example, there have been 
numerous studies on opinion formation [73, 74] and influence 
maximization models [75]. Here, we review the related studies 
about the spread of fake news. 
(1) Social influence and contagion. The concept of social 
contagion has expanded from the initial epidemic transmission 
to the process of information dissemination across social 
networks, such as political views [76], emotional changes [77], 
fashion trends [78], and financial decisions [79]. Some works 
measure the influence of opinions in social networks, aiming to 
make information far-reaching. For example, Morone et al. [80] 
introduce percolation theory [81] to social network influential 
node discovery and find that a large number of weakly-
connected (low-degree) nodes can be optimal influencers. 
Amati et al. [82] utilize degree, closeness, betweenness and 
PageRank-centrality of nodes in Dynamic Retweet Graph [83] 
 
11 https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/06/can-brain-scans-predict-musi
c-sales 
to find the most influential users in Twitter. In [84], Qiu et al. 
propose DeepInf, a deep learning-based influence prediction 
framework, which learns users’ latent social representation to 
evaluate their social influence by incorporating network 
embedding, graph convolution, and attention mechanism. 
Some studies concentrate on the contagion and persuasion 
mechanisms of messages in social networks. For instance, 
Ugander et al. [85] find that whether social network users will 
be infected depends on the number and structure of their 
interrelated components, rather than the actual size of the 
community. Therefore, different social environments and 
influences represented by target users’ neighbors can be 
considered as the driving mechanism of social contagion. In 
[86], Kramer et al. prove that each user’s emotions can be 
affected by other users in Facebook, which provides an 
experimental basis for massive-scale social influence and 
contagion. Abebe et al. [87] study the process of information 
contagion from the perspective of changes in people’s 
psychological sensitivity to persuasion. They further propose a 
dynamic model of social opinions that comprehensively utilizes 
the maximization and minimization of crowd opinions for 
influencing social opinions.  
 (2) Spreading models/mechanisms. As Ratkiewicz et al. [88] 
state, the early stages of the diffusion of rumors tend to show 
pathological patterns. Thus, some work has studied the 
spreading mechanisms and modes of online information to 
provide guidance for CogSec protection. For example, Friggeri 
et al. [89] track the propagation of thousands of rumors 
appearing on Facebook. They find that rumor cascades run 
deeper in the social network than normal sharing cascades. 
Vosoughi et al. [6] report that fake news is more novel than real 
news, suggesting that people are more willing to spread novel 
information. Besides, the true information usually evokes the 
users’ sadness, happiness, and trust, while fake news often 
triggers public surprise, fear, and disgust. Similarly, Peng et al. 
[90] find that users are more delight to hear positive gossip and 
more annoyed to hear negative gossip of themselves, compared 
with celebrities and their friends. Vicario et al. [31] find that 
misinformation in social networks often leads to homogeneous 
and polarized communities and propose a data-driven 
percolation model of misinformation spreading, which 
demonstrates that homogeneity and polarization are the 
determinants of predicting the size of information cascade.  
 Several works have been carried out on the opinion 
dynamics based on influence mechanism in social networks, 
which can be divided into discrete models [91, 92] and 
continuous models [93]. For instance, aiming at understanding 
the vulnerability of social networks and increasing users’ 
resilience to fake news, Wang et al. [94] propose a 
multivariable jump diffusion guidance framework, which 
models the dynamics of opinions and guides public opinions to 
the desired state. Martins et al. [95] propose an opinion 
diffusion model, CODA, in which different opinions of users 
are regarded as discrete variables and each opinion is modeled 
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as continuous opinion function. Target users decide whether to 
change their own opinions or not based on Bayesian 
descriptions of their neighbor opinions. In [96], Yang et al. 
design a role-aware information diffusion model (RAIN), 
which characterizes the interaction between users’ social roles 
and their influence on the spreading of information. 
C. Fake News Detection 
Since fake news has a great impact on social stability, 
economic development, and political democracy, it is 
imperative to study efficiently automatic fake news detection 
technology [19]. Recently, there have been several efforts on 
fake news detection, which can be divided into content-based, 
social context-based, and deep learning-based methods.  
(1) Content-based methods, which often rely on unique 
writing styles or language features in news content (e.g., lexical 
features, syntactic features, and topic features) [97, 98]. For 
example, Castillo et al. [99] calculate a series of linguistic 
features to evaluate Twitters’ credibility, including the average 
number of words, URL links, the number of positive words etc. 
Potthast et al. [100] propose a meta-learning model to detect 
fake news, which utilizes differences in writing styles between 
the truth and fake news. Hu et al. [101] propose a spammer 
detection method based on sentiment information. 
(2) Social context-based methods, which mainly focus on 
the characteristics of human-content interactions, such as user 
profiling, reposts, comments, stances, and likes etc. For 
example, Tacchini et al. [102] estimate that social media 
platform posts can be detected as hoax utilizing netizens’ like 
behaviors.  Ma et al. [103] make use of the temporal patterns of 
social context features to detect online rumors. In [104], Jin et 
al. propose a credibility propagation network model for rumor 
detection by mining supporting or opposing opinions in 
microblogs. Yang et al. [105] propose an unsupervised fake 
news detection model, incorporating the authenticity of news, 
users’ reputation, and users’ viewpoints on target news event. 
(3) Deep learning-based methods, which aim to learn latent 
representations of fake and real news accurately for further 
detection. Existing deep learning-based detection methods 
mainly apply convolution neural network (CNN) [106] and 
recurrent neural network (RNN) [107] models. For example, Li 
et al. [108] utilize the Bidirectional GRU model to detect online 
rumors, based on the observation that both the forward and 
backward sequences of social posts contain abundant 
interactive information. Liu et al. [109] find that there are 
obvious differences between the propagation patterns of true 
news and fake news, and they combine GRU (extracting global 
features) and CNN (extracting local features) to detect fake 
news. Ruchansky et al. [110] propose the RNN-based fake 
news detection model, incorporating textual features of news, 
user response, and the source users. Similarly, Shu et al. [111] 
further explore the social relations among publishers, news and 
online users [112, 113], and then propose a tri-relationship 
embedding network, TriFN, which models the human-content 
interactions for fake news detection. 
D. Malicious Bot Detection 
The popularity and openness of social network promote the 
emergence of social bots with certain autonomous decision-
making ability [114]. Like legitimate users, social bots can 
make friends, post tweets, thumb up, chat and so on through 
program control. Salge et al. [115] point out that about 8.5% of 
Twitter accounts are social bots, engaged in news, events, 
business communication and other tasks. Most social bots 
provide convenience for users to exchange information by 
automatically providing benign news and information, but there 
are also malicious social bots that can spread rumors and 
harmful information [114, 116, 117]. Recently, a large number 
of malicious bot detection methods have been proposed, which 
can be categorized as behavior-based, content-based, and 
influence-based methods.  
(1) Behavior-based detection methods. It is of great value to 
analyze and mine the behavior data of social bots in existing 
social networks [118]. Boshmaf et al. [119] analyze the 
differences between social bots and human users in terms of the 
number of friends, post time interval, post content and account 
attribute differences, and propose a random forest based social 
bot detection method. Haustein et al. [120] analyze the 
differences between real Twitter users and social bots in 
retweeting scientific articles, and find that social bots tend not 
to be selective in retweeting (involving topics, sources, etc.). In 
[121], Gilani et al. conduct a comparative study on the 
behaviors of human and social bots in posting and retweeting 
on Twitter, and find that social bots play a very important role 
in information transmission, despite their weak overall 
influence. Besides, Varol et al. [122] find that compared with 
human users, the interaction selection of social bots is more 
arbitrary and that there are fewer bidirectional connections 
between them and human users. 
 (2) Content-based detection methods, which focus on 
determining whether a message posted by a user is a malicious 
message. Generally, whether the URL in the message content 
points to the malicious page can be used to determine whether 
the account that published the message is malicious social bot. 
For instance, Thomas et al. [123] propose a real-time URL 
detection scheme, which extracts features of related URL pages 
by visiting each published URLs. What’s more, social bots can 
be detected through changes in the message content features. 
For example, Egele et al. [124] extract 7 content features, model 
the messages, and then judge whether the messages published 
later deviate from the created model to detect social bots. In 
[125], Kudugunta et al. propose a LSTM-based bot detection 
method, incorporating contextual features and accounts’ 
metadata for improving bot detection accuracy. Gao et al. [126] 
find that 63% of the text content of spam messages in Twitter 
is generated based on templates, and they propose the social bot 
detection framework, Tangram, which divides malicious posts 
into fields, generates matching templates, and detects more 
malicious social bots. 
(3) Influence-based detection methods, which detect social 
bots on the perspective of social influence. For example, 
Messias et al. [127] conduct comparative studies on analyzing 
the influence of social bots, and propose their malicious 
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behavior strategies, including regular posting tweets on a 
certain hot topic, different posting intervals, and attribute 
integrity. Similarly, Abokhodair et al. [128] analyze the posting 
behavior, social structure, group behavior characteristics and 
influence growth process of social bot network. Finally, they 
find that more human-like behaviors can improve social bot 
influence. Freitas et al. [129] create 120 different attributes (sex, 
occupation, etc.) and behavior strategies (active, posting action 
and interaction) of the social bots for characterizing their 
infiltration process, and they find that about 20% of the social 
bots gain more than 100 followers by means of high active 
interaction and posting behavior.  
IV. OPEN ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Though there have been initial efforts in the field of CogSec, 
there are still numerous research challenges to be tackled in the 
future, some of which are discussed below. 
(1) The human cognition mechanism of fake news. 
Regarding to CogSec protection, the first thing is to understand 
the human cognition mechanism of fake news. Acerbi [13] 
estimates that fake news can be successfully disseminated 
because it meets the general cognitive preferences of the public, 
which provides theoretical guidance for preventing the spread 
of fake news. With the rapid development of neuroscience, 
several studies have investigated the cognitive patterns of the 
human brain [57, 130, 131]. For example, Lewandowsky et al. 
[132] raise the problem of “technocognition” and summarize 
the ways in which fake news affect the society negatively. In 
[133], Arapakis et al. propose a measurement model for 
evaluating the interest changes of users in reading news, which 
is based on EEG registration of people’s neural activity. All in 
all, the research on the cognition mechanism of fake news 
correlates to multiple disciplines such as psychology, 
neuroscience and cognitive science. We still need to explore 
specific cognitive problems, partially summarized as follows. 
⚫ The influence of individual’s social cognition on large-
scale social behaviors. 
⚫ The common features of fake news satisfying users’ 
cognitive preferences. 
⚫ The effect of fake news content stimulations (text, 
pictures, audios or videos) on specific parts of the 
human brains. 
⚫ The impact of social interactions on individual’s 
cognition. 
⚫ The change of users’ cognitive characteristics with the 
dissemination of fake news. 
(2) The social contagion and diffusion models of fake news.  
Social contagion is a common phenomenon in human society 
[134], which contributes to opinion dynamics, behavior shaping, 
and cognitive preferences in social networks. Some works pay 
attention to modeling the contagion and propagation of 
information in social networks. For instance, Chang et al. [135] 
explore how social media marketing persuades users to share 
information with the purpose of achieving mass cohesion and 
information diffusion. Huang et al. [136] propose a social 
contagion model based on introducing a persuasion mechanism 
into the threshold model. They then estimate that persuasion 
mechanism improves the influence of information cascade in 
social networks, and that the effect of persuasion is often more 
significant in heterogenous social networks than in 
homogeneous networks. In the future, there are still numerous 
issues to be further studied: 
⚫ The study of novel information dissemination theories 
which introduce the users’ cognition preferences, 
timeliness of information, and social roles of 
individuals, etc. 
⚫ The evaluation of influential users on social networks 
for maximizing the impact of information 
dissemination. 
⚫ The fast influence maximization mechanisms of true 
information to the mass after fake news debunking.  
(3) Early detection of fake news. Information on social 
networks usually has a short life span, averaging less than three 
days, and fake news always spread like viruses with a few 
minutes [89, 137]. Actually, detection methods based on 
aggregation features (e.g., propagation characteristics, etc.) are 
difficult to achieve better performance on early detection [138]. 
Therefore, the early detection of fake news is an important issue. 
Some works attempt to identify fake news at their early 
spreading stage. For example, Zhao et al. [139] find that queries 
and objections in users’ comments contribute to early detection 
of rumors. Chen et al. [140] find that users tend to comment 
differently in different rumors’ spreading process and propose 
an RNN-based rumor detection model with attention 
mechanism for early detection. In [141], Sampson et al. utilize 
implicit linkages for acquiring additional information from 
several related events to deal with the problem that less data is 
available in the early detection of fake news.  Although several 
studies have been conducted on the early detection of fake news, 
the performances of them still need to be improved. 
  (4) Explainable fake news debunking. Existing automatic 
fake news detection models [99, 107] usually just give the 
testing results, with little decision-making basic explanations. 
However, the explanation in fake news debunking or the 
transparency of detection models is essential, which contributes 
to users’ trust in detection results, fusion of human-machine 
intelligence, and further prevention of the spread of fake news. 
Some studies utilize the attention mechanism [140, 142] and 
graph models [143, 144] for explainable fake news debunking. 
For instance, Popat et al. [145] propose an automatic end-to-
end fake news detection model combined with external 
evidence articles, DeClarE, based on Bidirectional LSTM with 
attention. Similarly, Guo et al. [146] introduce social contexts 
into rumor detection via attention mechanism to enhance the 
interpretability of detection models, based on hierarchical 
LSTM. Gad-Elrab et al. [147] propose a framework for 
generating explanations of candidate facts, incorporating 
knowledge graphs and texts, which provides reference for fake 
news detection. In general, explainable fake news debunking 
needs to explore more practical models with the development 
of interpretable machine learning (IML) [148, 149], such as 
probabilistic graphical model (PGM) [150], knowledge graph 
based on complex rules [151], and other mechanisms.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In the context of the spread of fake news in social networks, 
we present a novel research issue, named Cognitive Security 
(CogSec). In order to characterize the CogSec, we propose 
some relevant definitions and review several related findings, 
including echo chambers, online gatekeepers, media bias etc. 
We further investigate the key research challenges and 
techniques of CogSec, which can be categorized into human-
content cognition mechanism, social influence and opinion 
diffusion, fake news detection, and malicious bot detection. The 
study of CogSec is still at its early stage, and there are still 
numerous challenges and open issues to be addressed by AI 
researchers, social and neuroscience scientists, as well as 
security engineers.  
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